............................................................................... ON THE RECORD RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1 DATE: 5.12.93 ............................................................................... JOHN HUMPHRYS: Good afternoon and welcome to On the Record. Soldiers catching red and white National Express buses into battle; troops instead of tourists impatiently waiting at Gatwick for the endlessly delayed charter flight; tanks trundling in to the local service station for their one thousand mile service - is this what the future holds for our armed forces? Well, not quite; that's a crude exaggeration. But not THAT crude; selling off support services to civilian operators IS government policy and I'll be talking to Malcolm Rifkind, the Defence Secretary about the plan he calls Front Line First. ****** HUMPHRYS: David Walter reporting. Well earlier this week I interviewed Malcolm Rifkind, the Defence Secretary. I began by putting to him what some of the people had said in David Walter's film; that it was difficult to make substantial cuts to the tail without blunting the teeth. MALCOLM RIFKIND MP: Well not inevitably, of course, they are absolutely right to say that to have an effective fighting force in the front line you need proper support services, you can't expect the Army or the Navy or the Air Force to do their job properly unless they're being provided with the equipment, the logistics, with the other kinds of support they require. So there is a connection but, and it's an important but, there's a great deal of the services that are provided in the armed forces that are not military in nature but which are never the less, effectively done and can be done even more effectively, in some cases, by either the private sector or by civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence. HUMPHRYS: For instance. RIFKIND: Well I'll give you an example. During the Gulf War, we found that there were a number of very highly trained mechanics belonging to a particular firm who happened to be in Kuwait at the time and they volunteered to stay on, they carried out a superb job with the maintenance for certain of our aircraft and afterwards it was recognised this was actually a very good way of meeting the needs of the RAF at less expensive cost in terms of manpower and.....personnel. HUMPHRYS: But the reality is surely, or at least your military people are telling you, are they not, that the reality is there are very few jobs now done by the military, whether you are talking about transport, whether you are talking about catering, whether you are talking about any kind of logistics, that - or mechanics as you mentioned yourself earlier, that can be done by civilians. They are done now by the military for a very good reason. RIFKIND: No, that's not what I am being told - quite the opposite. I think there is a great deal of interest in examining whether there is a role here that can be properly taken forward and, you know, even when we have gone for market testing and when we have decided that the company doing the job are the people who should continue doing it, very often we have found very substantial savings because once they have been required to identify what is the least expensive way in which they can provide these services, sometimes savings which were not previously noticed become apparent and they are very, very valuable. HUMPHRYS: You mean what you're saying at the moment is that they're inefficient, if they're given a little spur and told careful or you'll lose your job, they suddenly become efficient? RIFKIND: It's not a question of inefficient, no, I think that's an unfair word to use. I think very often there are new practices which are now available. For example, with modern information technology, sometimes it is possible to do things in a more cost-effective way than might have even been possible three or four years ago. The pace of change is so dramatic that it's actually sensible to be up-to-date with the latest way in which you can actually deliver a service. So it's not a question of necessarily of identifying inefficiency, it's a question of actually using one's imagination and in an original way, finding less expensive ways of providing the same service. HUMPHRYS: But there's a real limit as to how much money you can save in that area, is there not? RIFKIND: Absolutely. Because there is a certain amount that has already been done and I pay tribute to what has already been achieved in that direction over the last two or three years. What we are exploring is how far that particular frontier can be put. HUMPHRYS: And something else that you're looking at is mothballing, again, a real limit there. RIFKIND: Well mothballing is a very interesting phrase, not one we would normally use. What we are certainly saying is that during the cold war period, we were faced with the huge Warsaw Pact forces poised in the middle of Germany just a few hundred miles from Belgium, from the Netherlands, from the English Channel, if a war had broken out, clearly you would not have had time to simply plan how you were going to respond. You had to be able to respond very, very quickly indeed. Now we're not in that situation, the possibility of that kind of conflict is very much more remote. Take Russia for example, Russia today is a great friend but even if it wasn't a friend, the Russian frontier begins a thousand miles further east than it did five years ago. So that means that you actually have an opportunity to have a longer preparatory time if there was an increase in international tension. HUMPHRYS: The question is how long isn't it, we're told that, for instance, a fighting ship that has been mothballed takes six months properly to be de-mothballed. Now you don't get a warning of six months of a war do you? RIFKIND: Well you've raised the question of mothballing, I'm not contemplating significant mothballing. Very occasionally we have a ship or something of that kind which is available but not immediately available. That is not going to be a significant part of our strategy. HUMPHRYS: You're going to raise money by selling houses, property. RIFKIND: Well, we have some sixty nine thousand housing quarters, married quarters, for Army, Navy and Air Force housing. We think it is sensible that that should be put in the responsibility of a non-profit-making housing trust who will administer these houses on our behalf and actually provide a housing expertise that we have not in the past had. Up till now our Army housing, for example, has been administered by uniformed personnel, by soldiers, and I don't think many people joined the Army in order to administer housing. What we want to do is actually get that tremendous expertise that exists already in the wider community and get people who know about housing to run housing. HUMPHRYS: How flexible are you about MOD property generally, about the Army's property in London, for example? I mean, Knightsbridge Barracks would fetch a tidy sum on the market, wouldn't it? RIFKIND: I think these are matters that need to be genuinely looked at. In the old days, a hundred years ago or two hundred years ago, you kept soldiers in the capital in case there was an uprising and you needed to suddenly call out the Army for that reason. That, I am happy to say, is no longer a relevant consideration. You need to have some soldiers based in Central London ... HUMPHRYS: Not necessarily in Knightsbridge. RIFKIND: Well, not necessarily in Knightsbridge, that's a matter that needs to be looked at. What I am saying is we have ceremonial duties, the responsibilities of the Household Division in Central London and therefore that and some similar tasks need to be done by people who are quite close to the centre of London. But you are quite right, we need to look at this very expensive property that we have in Central London. If it doesn't need to be there then it needs not to be there. HUMPHRYS: So if I were an estate agent I should drop you a line and say: "When you are thinking of selling Knightsbridge Barracks, give me first refusal". RIFKIND: Well, the first judgement that has to be made is: do we have an operational need to have various properties - don't just think of Knightsbridge - barracks ... HUMPHRYS: But you just answered that on Knightsbridge - the answer's 'no'. RIFKIND: What I am saying is that we have a number of barracks in Central London, we do need certainly to have some accommodation in order to meet the ceremonial requirements of troops in Central London. What we will be examining over the next few months is whether we need all we've got and, if we don't, which of the various properties that exist might be disposed of - and I'm not going to speculate today which they might be. HUMPHRYS: All right, but nothing is sacred, there are no sacred cows here. RIFKIND: That is correct. HUMPHRYS: You talk about the ceremonial duties. Why should all these very tall men in their shiny handsome, shiny boots parading around London be paid for out of the fighting fund? RIFKIND: Because they are soldiers and remember in our case the Household Division, The Blues and Royals, The Lifeguards, The Household Cavalry, they're not just ceremonial soldiers they are modern professional soldiers (interuption)... they spend a great part of their time training to be fighting men and they have very important operational roles. Part of their time is on ceremonial duties and that is part of our national heritage, it's part of our tradition. I think it's an excellent part of our tradition, I have no intention of diminishing it because I think it makes a very viable contribution not only to the image of our armed forces but it's also what people think Britain is all about and that is, I think, something positive and desirable. HUMPHRYS: But maybe somebody else should pay - the Tourists Board perhaps. RIFKIND: No. They are soldiers. They are professional soldiers, they have spent part of their time on ceremonial duties but they spend most of their time as fighting soldiers, properly trained to carry out proper roles. HUMPHRYS: You say that what you are doing, the cuts that you have accepted or that have been imposed upon you but we'll come to that in a moment - will not reduce the effectiveness of the armed forces. RIFKIND: Well, we've taken two decisions. The Cabinet is quite clear that it wants to seek to maintain the fighting capability of our armed forces and, therefore, what we are doing under the theme of Front Line First is we are identifying the savings that can be achieved from back-up support services in order to ensure that that is indeed not just an aspiration but a reality. HUMPHRYS: But even without any further cuts we don't at the moment have enough ships in the Navy to move our troops around effectively. RIFKIND: I don't accept that. We certainly do have enough ships. We have some hundred and thirty ships in the Royal Navy plus twenty ships in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. That is quite sufficient to meet our requirements. During a combat situation, the Falklands or in the Gulf, it has always been a tradition, it goes back many, many years that you hire ships, merchant ships, to carry some of your freight requirements and that's perfectly proper and a very sensible way of going about things and that's been true for a hundred years. HUMPHRYS: But the Merchant Navy is changing. Let me quote to you what Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt of the Chamber of Shipping has said. A fifty ship fleet in support of a Falkland's type campaign might require two thousand five hundred to three thousand officers and ratings. This would require around one third of the total British Merchant Navy manpower predicted for the year two thousand - an almost impossible burden. RIFKIND: Well, I don't see it as an impossible burden at all. We have recently reviewed this very question and there is no doubt, as we found in both the Gulf and in the Falklands, that if one requires additional merchant ships to carry freight, to carry supplies, during such a conflict, not only can one get the ships but one can get the crews as well. There are very, very many more British merchant seamen than we would require in any conceivable conflict and I believe that that is therefore something that can be achieved. HUMPHRYS: Well, the experts disagree with you on that. Eric Grove says: "No longer enough militarily efficient merchant vessels in the British registers to fulfil the national sea lift requirements". A man who has made a great study of these things. RIFKIND: Well, I appreciate that and obviously everyone is entitled to their opinion, but we have also made a very great study. We have looked at what was actually required during the Gulf War, what was actually required during the Falkland's War, we've envisaged various scenarios as to what might be necessary in some future occasion and we are satisfied that the merchant shipping that would be available would meet our requirements. HUMPHRYS: We had three refrigerated ships down at the Falklands, we've got none in the fleet now. RIFKIND: Well, you don't need to have them in your fleet all the time. HUMPHRYS: But there aren't any available to us. RIFKIND: There are huge numbers of ships around the world and if you wish to contract for a ship if you require it there is not the slightest difficulty in obtaining one. It would be extremely foolish for us to permanently keep ships of the kind that you have described in the Royal Navy which would be very expensive and which might be required only on one occasion in every ten or fifteen years. HUMPHRYS: And I am not suggesting that you do ... RIFKIND: The criteria ... the test is: can you get them when you need them? And if the answer is 'yes' and unequivocally 'yes' then that is a sensible way to use your resources. HUMPHRYS: But the answer from the Merchant Navy people is unequivocally 'no'. I mean, let me quote somebody else to you. Sir Michael Quinlan: "You cannot structure your armed forces on the basis that you send civilians into war zones," and what we are talking about is civilians manning these ships and not just civilians but now increasingly foreign civilians, not British citizens. RIFKIND: I'm afraid that simply doesn't match. We had the Falklands. In the Falklands not only did we have merchant ships, not only did we have a lot of civilians who were available in the South Atlantic, we even had a number of foreign citizens who served on these ships as volunteers, because it clearly has to be volunteers, and there has been no difficulty in the past. Do remember ... HUMPHRYS: But things have changed, that's the point. More ships are registered under foreign flags now, the British Merchant Navy is smaller than it was. RIFKIND: That is true, but the question is: could we get ships if we needed them? And the evidence, the overwhelming evidence, as we saw in the Gulf just a relatively short time ago, was that there are infinitely more ships around the world available to be chartered than you could possibly require. HUMPHRYS: You had months to plan that operation in the Gulf, there was no hurry getting all the material to the Gulf zone, it wouldn't have been like that in the Falklands, for instance, we got that fleet together in three days, didn't we? RIFKIND: Well, we got the Task Force, but, no, many of the supporting ships joined subsequently. HUMPHRYS: Yes but in a very short time. I mean the thing was down there in a matter of weeks. RIFKIND: Well, the fact is that you can get your fighting ships, the actual Royal Navy is there ready to go whenever required. HUMPHRYS: But they need support, as you've acknowledged. RIFKIND: Of course they do, of course they do, and we have the Royal Fleet Auxiliary that provides most of the support that is necessary. If the size of an operation is particularly large then we, like every Navy in the world, the American Navy, the French Navy, any other Navy you care to mention does not keep large numbers of ships just on the off-chance that it might need them. This is not fighting ships I am talking about this is merchant ships. What you do is you go and charter them. That's what every country does. It's what we have done for a hundred years. Why should we change now? HUMPHRYS: Well, because we don't have the Merchant Navy that we had a hundred years ago and that's the point that the experts make. However ... RIFKIND: No, let me just make a final comment on that. We of course have a far smaller Merchant Navy and I appreciate that the Merchant Navy itself is campaigning for a different Government strategy because it wants to see Government financial help to building up the Merchant Navy. That's a perfectly ... HUMPHRYS: But it's not lying about the figures, is it? RIFKIND: I'm not suggesting it is, far from it. What I'm saying is that even the smaller Merchant Navy that we have at the moment is able to meet our requirements, that is a matter which we've studied in great depth in recent months and that is the conclusion we've come to. HUMPHRYS: Even if you achieve next year's cuts and perhaps the year's after without damaging the military efficiency..the British Armed Forces, you have doubts about the following year's cuts don't you. RIFKIND: Well there aren't any following year's cuts that have been determined. HUMPHRYS: But you know the kind of money you're going to have to save. RIFKIND: Well what we have got at the moment, we know the figures that are available for the next three years, like all government departments we do not know what will happen thereafter. HUMPHRYS: But the third year worries you? RIFKIND: The third year is the one which I'm not yet able to say precisely how we are going to meet that particular requirement, that's what I said to the Select Committee on Defence a few days ago. I know the approach we are going to take to identify the answers that we need and we will find these answers over the next few months and what we are going to do is to establish a particular study which will look at the costs of the defence needs that we have and that will provide the responses that we need. HUMPHRYS: But when you say something like that you can understand perhaps why it worries people on the Defence Select Committee for instance, you'll be aware of the comment, the quote that I'm about to read to you from the Defence Select Committee report of September '93 "A careful reading of the defence estimates which is subtitled "Defending our future" produces very little idea of which national interests are to be defended and where in what order of priorities and in the face of which anticipated threats and dangers" RIFKIND: Yes, I studied that report very carefully, I'm not actually clear the basis of that concern. If you read the White Paper defending our future you will see that the commitments that we have are very clearly spelled out, they are the committments you would expect us to have. The first committment: the defence of the United Kingdom itself and that includes our commitment in Northern Ireland because they are citizens of the United Kingdom; we have our committment to NATO which underpins our whole defence strategy, we have the contribution we make through the United Nations and through other international organisations to international security and stability. For example, the superb job that the British forces are doing in Bosnia at the present time. HUMPHRYS: Let me tell you what they mean. Matching resources to tasks is becoming increasingly fraught, stretching both crews and vessels to unwise levels even during peace time - talking about the Navy here. In the event of a full scale war, the Royal Navy would be incapable of defending our sea routes. This shortcoming poses a serious and potentially fatal threat to the long-term security of this country. And this is today, this is not in three years time after the knife has been wielded. RIFKIND: First of all the knife is not going to be wielded on our front-line, the fighting capability of the Armed Forces is not being reviewed and is not going to be reviewed because that is the priority that we have identified. I accept that the Select Committee on Defence, which has some extremely enthusiastic proponents of defence and good luck to them.. HUMPHRYS: Members of your own party of course. RIFKIND: Absolutely so and they want the strongest defence possible and they continually probe the government to make sure we're up to scratch and that's perfectly fair, that's what Select Committees are all about and at the end of the day what I have to come to a judgement on, what the government has to come to a judgement on is first of all what are the defence requirements of the United Kingdom? Can we meet the committments that we have at the moment or are likely to face in the years to come? Now, when we think we are not doing that effectively we make changes. For example, a few days ago I indicated an additional three thousand men for the field army, dealing with some of the units which have been overstretched in ways that the Select Committee itself quite correctly pointed to. So, when there is legitimate criticism, very happy to respond. What we have to do is be certain that we are actually creating a fighting force that can actually carry out our national interest. HUMPHRYS: But should you not be dancing to a slightly different tune? Should you not be looking at the Foreign Office's own requirements as opposed to the Treasury's requirements? At the moment it is seen that you are dancing to a Treasury tune because you are told...well you are told here is the amount of money that you can have Secretary of State, are you not? RIFKIND: Not by the Treasury, the Cabinet as a whole discusses... HUMPHRYS: But acting under Treasury imperatives. RIFKIND: Well of course you are right that there has been a very major problem with the PSBR, the borrowing deficit, we've had to get that down but you know as well as I do that the Treasury starts off with certain proposals with all government departments. Treasury doesn't get its way competely, nor does any other department. There is a collective discussion and you come to a conclusion as to what is appropriate and what is I think important this year is that the Cabinet have said quite clearly that Britain's fighting capability is something we wish to keep. Where we want to find savings is in the cost of some of the support ... HUMPHRYS: Well the Chancellor talking to me yesterday made it quite clear that defence has a lower priority than it had. RIFKIND: Well of course, the Cold War is over. It would be astonishing otherwise. HUMPHRYS: But we haven't responded to that. RIFKIND: Of course we have. We have had a reduction in defence expenditure of some twenty per cent and that's very similar to what's happened in the United States and France and Germany and Russia itself. Of course defence can't be said to be the same priority as when you're facing several million troops of the Warsaw Pact, right across the middle of Germany. Of course if's different. HUMPHRYS: Final point, wouldn't it make your life easier in the long run, I know there are enormous political difficulties whenever it's even mentioned, if there were a full scale proper defence review - it's many years since we've had one, then you could say "right, now we are quite clear about what our priorities are" and there is political agreement. RIFKIND: It's a marvellous theory, it's absolute baloney. I remember in John Notts' day, when he was Defence Secretary, there was a review and everyone said that will solve all the problems. Within a few weeks people said "this review's out of date" and then the Falklands happened and people said "my God, it's really out of date, we should have another defence review because it's a totally different world". The reality is we know the committments that we have. They are spelt out very clearly in the "Defending Our Future" - the White Paper - we know the kind of challenge that we face. I'm not going to create another layer of total uncertainity for months and months and months, asking questions which we already know the answers to and where I know perfectly well that when we published our conclusions anyone who didn't like them would say "out of date, we must start all over again." That's not the way forward. HUMPHRYS: Malcolm Rifkind, thank you very much. . ...oooOOOooo...