................................................................................ ON THE RECORD RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 24.4.93 ................................................................................ JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: Welcome to On The Record which starts today in Hong Kong where I will be interviewing the Governor, Chris Patten, at a critical moment in relations between the Government of China and the Government of this last significant British colony. Here in Hong Kong Chris Patten's stock has risen over the last few days almost as sharply as the Hang Seng Index. After six months of chronic anxiety, tempered by acute alarm, the people of this jittery colony are investing their hopes in the crucial talks between Britain and China that opened on Thursday and which many of them believe will settle the fate of Hong Kong for better or worse. Can Chris Patten honour his commitment to freedom and democracy here or will the talks inevitably founder as the two sides fail to bridge the diplomatic chasm that now exists between them. I'll be trying to find out from the man himself as Britain enters what is for the Government, and for him personally, a most testing round of eyeball to eyeball diplomacy and, to identify the obstacles ahead, Michael Gove now reports on the devisive build up to this critical moment. ********* DIMBLEBY: Governor, there's been a prolonged atmosphere of crisis here. Now the talks are underway I want to explore with you if I may the prospects of success and the consequences of failure. When you came here, you came here with a commitment to protect and enhance Hong Kong's freedoms - an objective which I have to presume remains funamental to you? CHRIS PATTEN: Yes, Hong Kong's way of life and Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. I mentioned all those things. DIMBLEBY: And freedom? PATTEN: And freedom. Freedom is part of Hong Kong's way of life and it's one of the reasons why Hong Kong's prosperous. DIMBLEBY: And one of the reasons why your proposals for democracy, for extending democracy here, are important to you? PATTEN: Yes, I think there is a very close relationship between a credible, not necessarily a totally democratic, but a credible legislative council and the rule of law. DIMBLEBY: But those proposals you yourself described as modest. We know they provoked something, at least in public, like apoplexy in the Chinese capital, which is why we have the tension at the moment. PATTEN: Alas yes. DIMBLEBY: Now, we are on the verge of these talks, but you were on the verge of putting your proposals before the legislators of Hong Kong. It must be somewhat frustrating for you is it not, to now to have those proposals back in the melting pot of talks and postponed from decision by the people of Hong Kong. PATTEN: I think it's a bit frustrating for people in Hong Kong despite the fact that there is an overall enthusiasm for getting talks going. The main frustration as far as we're concerned - as far as I'm concerned and the British Government and maybe a large part of the community - is that we weren't talking last October. I'm sorry that it took until as it were until the eleventh hour for talks to get going, but better late than never. DIMBLEBY: But that's the Chinese responsibility? PATTEN: Well, we've been prepared to talk since last October. DIMBLEBY: Is there any truth in the widespread reports that the only reason why the talks are now taking place is because the Foreign Office has been rather more assiduous in pursuing talks with the Chinese than you yourself have been anxious to be? PATTEN: No, we've been at one, completely at one on the need for talks and I repeat that I'm only sorry that they didn't start earlier. DIMBLEBY: Did the Chinese give way? PATTEN: I think it's more helpful to say that we found ways round one or two rather unnecessary problems which had been created. DIMBLEBY: That may be helpful. May I ask whether you had to shift ground backwards to compromise in order to find your way into finding their way round? PATTEN: If you take the recent talks about talks there's nothing in the basis of the talks that we've now started that we couldn't have accepted at the beginning of March. DIMBLEBY: There must be, given the background that you've just identified, considerable doubts about the prospect for both enhancing your democracy here and for a successful outcome of the talks? PATTEN: Well, I think that it's perhaps unfair to talk about the argument in terms of enhancing democracy. There's already an agreed path towards a more democratic legislative council. The nub of the argument is whether the arrangements that in broad terms we've agreed to are going to be conducted in a way which is fair and credible, whether the limited amount of democracy that we'll have in Hong Kong will be a credible... DIMBLEBY: But your proposals were designed to enhance democracy. They increase the number of people who have a vote. PATTEN My proposals were designed to ensure that we had fair elections. DIMBLEBY: Now, on the table in these negotiations,
designed to discuss how you get to that point, your proposals are going to have to be on the table. I want to establish the framework in which these talks are going to take place. Those proposals presumably will have to be on the table. PATTEN: Well, they're.. the proposals we've put forward, they've been debated in the legislative council reasonably enthusiastically on a couple of occasions. They continue to command very considerable public support in Hong Kong and so of course they're there. DIMBLEBY: And if they're not discussed thoroughly and if the Chinese aren't happy to listen to them being enthusiastically promoted, those talks will get nowhere fast? PATTEN: Well, what I hope those talks will do is to encourage Chinese officials to put forward proposals. I gather from what's been said in the last few months the Chinese officials aren't excessively keen on the proposals I put forward. Indeed I know that from the talks I had in Peking last Autumn, but I think we need to move on in a businesslike and constructive way to consider any Chinese alternatives. DIMBLEBY: Does that mean that you are prepared in the process of being constructive to modify, to compromise, to water down, your proposals? PATTEN: Well, I don't think I want to use words like water down, but since I put forward these ideas as proposals last October rather than as a fait accompli it follows that if we think there are better ways of securing fair elections in 1994 and 1995 we'll accept them. DIMBLEBY: But it's inconceivable that the Chinese
would think that better ways would include increasing the scale of democracy. PATTEN: Well, there are elements which haven't been discussed until recently, at least not in the sort of detail that one might like, which I think the community is increasingly interested in,and I think they're elements which will form part of the discussions, for example, what exactly is meant by the so-called through train? How exactly it's going to be possible not just to have arrangements which continue through 1997, but also legislators who were elected in 1995 and continue through 1997. DIMBLEBY: Well, I want to pursue that in just a second, but if you can get something along those lines which we'll come to, are you then prepared to make the structure of your proposals effectively weaker, so that the franchise is not, for instance, so extensive, that not so many people have quite such a vote? PATTEN: Well, I'll tell you what I'm not prepared to do which is to negotiate about the proposals on television, seductive as the prospect may be. DIMBLEBY: I'm sure it is very seductive to negotiate on television.... PATTEN: What I will say is that we've gone into these discussions, we've gone into these negotiations constructively, in a positive spirit as diplomats might put it. DIMBLEBY: Which means a spirit of give and take and therefore of compromise. PATTEN: Which means that if you want to have an acceptable solution at the end of the day you do need to have a bit of give and take, but give and take has to be on both sides. DIMBLEBY: Right, now, let's come to what might be the give on their side then, which is what you referred to as the through train. You would not be happy to do a deal unless you were convinced, am I right, that anyone elected in 1995 while Britain still administers the colony should be able to be confident that they will still be there at the next elections in 1999 when China is the sovereign power? PATTEN: I think the community would scratch its head and say "What's the point of us having arrangements which allegedly converge with the basic law after 1997 if even when people are elected under those arrangements they can be chucked out in 1997. The whole idea of a through train pre-supposes that you get a ticket at one end and, provided you meet the terms of the ticket, you can travel through to the destination at the other. It's a pretty rum through train which has people getting on half-way along the journey and turfing you off. DIMBLEBY: But there are well known figures here, the Martin Lees of Hong Kong, who are regarded with great anathema by Peking. Are you saying that you would not happily, knowingly, do a deal of a kind which would have Martin Lee - presuming he were very probably going to be elected in '95 - turfed off the train in '97? PATTEN: Well, I think the community, and it comes out in all the polls not very surprisingly, I think the community would scratch its head a bit about an agreement which was entirely about institutional arrangements and didn't take account of legislators. DIMBLEBY: So you want that commitment from the Chinese unequivocally? PATTEN: Well, not just me wanting it, and I notice that one of the.. I think it's a slightly pejorative expression, but a pro-Peking party in Hong Kong this week, the Democratic Alliance for the betterment of Hong Kong, expressed its anxieties about the importance of clarifying exactly what the through train would mean. DIMBLEBY: But if they clarify it and they say this "The through train means that come 1997 in our interpretation of the basic law
we apply a loyalty test and if we don't judge the politicians to be loyal, then sorry they get off the train". PATTEN: Well, I don't think you can have a subjective loyalty test which is going to be applied at some time in the future and expect that to provide you with the clarity which is I think required. DIMBLEBY: So for you this is a core issue, to be confident that when you come back if you get a deal, you can say to the people of Hong Kong, "I believe, I have no reason not to believe, that the Chinese now are committed to allowing anyone elected in '95 to be there four years on"? PATTEN: I strongly suspect that people in Hong Kong want a real through train. DIMBLEBY: And because of that you are, you are, it's your bottom line as well on that? PATTEN: Yes, I think that they are actually much keener on the through train concept than on some of the other things that we'll be arguing about and I think that is going to be the really difficult question both for Chinese officials and for me and for British Government officials to answer after these talks. What sort of clarity now is there about not just the legislative... not just the electoral process but about electors... about legislators themselves. DIMBLEBY: That's very clear. Is it also unequivocal that the Chinese must understand that any deal - if you get a deal - will be subject to approval by the legislators in Hong Kong before it means anything? PATTEN: Yes, the Chinese officials of course argue and I understand the point, that talks are between the sovereign powers, between the present sovereign and the future sovereign. They also understand that under the Royal instructions, the letters patent and so on, that the legislative council has the responsibility for legislating. They recognised
that before 1997, just as the basic law recognises it after 1997. I can't appear in front of the legislative council and say, "Here are arrangements for 1994 and 1995, they will exist on my fiat, I have to legislate in order to provide the arrangements and in order to get the legitimacy from the community. DIMBLEBY: And that would require a majority of the politicians in the legislative council? PATTEN: Of course. DIMBLEBY: And if they want to modify they are entitled under your understanding of their powers, to modify? PATTEN: But then we would have to be in a position in which we went back to China and explained that. I think ... DIMBLEBY: So China now has a veto over what is over possible in Legco? PATTEN: No, what I was saying was that if the legislative council modified arrangements that we'd agreed with China, we would, in the first instance, have to go back to China if we thought that was the right thing to do. There is - let me explain what I mean by that conditional sentence. The legislative council can't do anything which would oblige us to contravene international agreements we've reached, for example the joint declaration, or for example our commitments at the UN on civil liberties, so there are some limits to what the legislative council can do, but I think it's recognised on all sides that the legislative council have to legislate. DIMBLEBY: But if for instance, the legislative council were to say, "Well, we heard what happened up in Peking, we didn't particularly care for it, we very much liked Governor, your original proposals". They could say - which you were going to put at Legco in any case - they could say "We're going to go for them". Do you have to go back to China then? PATTEN: Well, I think it is extremely unlikely that we would reach an agreement which we didn't believe the legislative council would accept, so I'm rather reluctant to be lured down lots of hypothetical boulevards. DIMBLEBY: Okay. The other aspect of negotiations with China is in the past their longevity. In this case you're against the clock - you've got a deadline. Have you told the Chinese that you've got a deadline? PATTEN: I think if one talks about deadlines when you're starting to negotiate they have a rather unfortunate effect of blowing up. I don't like talking about deadlines because they do sound a bit like ultimatums, but the position is quite simply this. We do need to have in place, in time, arrangements for 1994 and '95. That requires a lot of administrative work, it also requires legislation, so the calendar dictates a certain pace to these negotiations. Now, I don't want to do or say anything which makes it more difficult for those negotiations to succeed. If the negotiations are going well, then one will want to give them as much time as is required. DIMBLEBY: But you could not conceivably, given what you've said about preparing legislation, go into next year on these negotiations, could you, without running into terrible trouble. PATTEN: It would create some problems if we were going on that long, and I think the community might also be wondering whether we shouldn't have settled things by then. DIMBLEBY: The community has been given the impression that July is the preferred deadline. PATTEN: Well, I think that it's fair to say that the sooner the better, but I don't really want to start ringing dates in the calendar, because I repeat, I think it then makes it much more difficult for our negotiators. DIMBLEBY: But we would not be wrong to suppose that if it gets beyond October you're into serious trouble. PATTEN: I think it starts to get very difficult for the district elections in particular, which are to be held next year, because candidates for those elections would really want to be starting to get to know their constituencies in the Autumn of this year, so it would create
considerable problems for the district elections. DIMBLEBY: Although the... well, let's not pursue that any further, because obviously for '95 the same must apply, the nearer it gets to '95 the same difficulties. Do you have the authority from the Prime Minister effectively to say, under the circumstances in which the Chinese might say, "We're enjoying these talks, let's continue them, they might - you're listening to our principles, we're listening to your views, but we want to go on talking". Do you have the delegated authority to say "I'm sorry, time's up because we've got to get these proposals - whatever they're going to be - into the legislative council"? PATTEN: I think whether the talks are going very well, or whether they're going less well, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will take some notice of my views on the process, but obviously the final responsibility is with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. DIMBLEBY: Just to see where we've got to so far. You're going to discuss your proposals, but you're prepared to listen to what you regard as potentially better proposals. You believe that the through train, on which you've got a very clear strong position, is of the utmost importance and you're not going to compromise very much on that front. Legco has the final say although you don't expect to put anything to them which you don't think they'll accept and there is a time limit which is coming up rapidly. Now that's not the bottom line, but it's a pretty clear outline of where Britain is negotiating from. What makes you think there is a cat in hell's chance of the Chinese, who've been on at you as if you were the devil incarnate precisely for the kinds of things that you believe in and for what you've been saying, are going to remotely do a deal with you? PATTEN: I think it's hugely in our joint interest to have a successful outcome to these negotiations, hugely. It matters for Hong Kong, it matters for China, it matters for Britain, it matters that we're able to conduct the next four years as competently and decently as possible and it matters that after that Hong Kong's way of life is preserved. DIMBLEBY: You have to presume then that the Chinese have changed their view from the one which they have uttered with a great passion and conviction over the last six months in which they have rejected your proposals, where the through train issue is one they're not prepared to discuss because it's all written in tablets of stone, what makes you think they've changed? PATTEN: I think that Chinese officials recognise their own interest and recognise the important role which Hong Kong can play and will play in the further successful development of China. DIMBLEBY: You see, your critics, the Sinologists in London, former civil servants, some politicians, politicians in the business community here who are severely critical of you, say Patten lives, albeit it with a good heart, in cloud cuckoo land when it comes to the Chinese. PATTEN: Well there are some of those people who find it difficult to accept that in diplomacy or negotiations you should ever have a bottom line, certainly that you should ever stand on a bottom line. There are also others who seem to have some difficulty in recognising the relationship between the rule of law and Hong Kong's success. DIMBLEBY: If the critics are right - indeed, conceivably if the critcs are not right - the talks might... would collapse. Under those circumstances, you would presumably then put before Legco, the legislative council, the proposals which are already yours and printed. PATTEN: I don't want to contemplate failure, I don't think that it's very sensible to set out on difficult negotiations by assuming that things are going to go wrong, but if we were unable to reach agreement with China, we're still in a position in which we have the responsibility for putting forward proposals for the '94 and '95 elections. It's not a problem that we've imagined or dreamt up - those arrangements haven't been agreed. DIMBLEBY: Under those circumstances, which you say you don't want to contemplate, none the less any serious politician has to contemplate that kind of worst case when you go into negotiations, you would end up with a very grim prospect indeed - talks broken down, the Chinese denouncing you even more passionately if possible than they have done hitherto,
setting up probably their alternative government, the so-called second stove or
second kitchen, in an atmosphere poisoned by alarm and pessimism. PATTEN: Well you've sketched out there a pretty cheerful prospect, I don't actually think that I necessarily share that view. If at the end of, I hope sincere negotiations, we weren't able to reach an agreement, I hope we could at least agree to disagree and get on with the other things in life which are important. Chinese officials do say from time to time that there's no relationship between economics and politics. I think it would be nice to have conclusive evidence of that. DIMBLEBY: In respect of the talks at this moment do you count yourself optimistic, pessimistic? PATTEN: Oh, I'm always an optimist, but a realist as well. DIMBLEBY: Governor Chris Patten, thank you very much. ...oooOooo...