................................................................................ ON THE RECORD LORD OWEN INTERVIEW RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 2.5.93 ................................................................................ JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: And now, in Athens, the man who was at the centre and has been at the centre of the negotiations which have brought about this potential end of the war in Bosnia. ***********
But let's go first straight to Athens where the press conference came to an end a short time ago, after the talks had finished. Here now are some of the key points which emerged from it. LORD OWEN: Firstly this is a happy day, a day in the Balkans, a day in Athens, the sunshine and let's hope that this does mark the moment of an irreversible peace process for Bosnia Herzegovina, so we have the twelve signatures that makes the peace plan. Dr. Karadzic has of course made his signature, which is a commitment, but it would be overtaken if there was to be an adverse decision by his Republic of Serbska(phon) Assembly, but he has signed the document, he's committed his delegation, and for that decision, a brave and courageous decision, I thank him, as I thank all the parties that have contributed to the compromises and to the painful decisions to allow a comprehensive peace settlement to be established. We are determined to set in motion a process of healing but also a process in which the odious practice of ethnic cleansing is reversed, we are determined to establish a atmosphere where once again Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, live together, inter-marry, share the same apartments and generally live as they did before this tragic war. And I think this is a time at the moment to set aside talk of military options. I don't deny that perhaps it has helped concentrate people's minds, given the gravity of the situation over the last few months, in Bosnia Herzegovina, that people have looked to all forms of pressure, but now I think it is time to talk of peace and not of war. DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, I watched you - and people watching this programme watched you - at the Press Conference. You were looking quietly confident, relaxed, a rather happy man. Is that a fair assessment? LORD OWEN: Yes, it is. I mean, I think you can hardly labour like we've done for the last eight months and not be mighty pleased that you've now got within a very close distance now of a comprehensive peace settlement. I do think that there will not be trouble on Wednesday when this is put to the Serbian Assembly, but even if there was, I think the commitment of the Yugoslav Government now to the peace settlement is total and they will deliver it, even if there were to be problems with the Assembly, but I don't expect that. DIMBLEBY: Milosovic has been absolutely crucial to this. OWEN: Yes, absolutely, and that's the person who I think I've always believed would ultimately deliver a settlement. It had to be a fellow Serb who, to persuade the Bosnian Serbs, that this was a fair compromise and that they should sign up for it. DIMBLEBY: Why do you think that he changed his ground? For eight months, as you say, you've been trying to persuade the Serbs to "see sense". Why has he taken so long to deliver and what turned him? OWEN: Well, for quite some many months we couldn't get the Bosnian Government, the Muslims, to accept the agreement either. We got the Croats on board relatively easily, but even that took us some time, but over the last month since we've had the Bosnian Government, it's been possible to concentrate predominantly I suppose on the Serbs. I think that all these pressures that have mounted have been extremely important, and when I negotiated with Milosovic, what I think was the crucial point really, Sunday afternoon in Belgrade, he wanted to avoid having the next tranche of economic sanctions and I think he, as a former banker, he knew perfectly well
these were going to hurt and we tried very hard to get the settlement agreed then and there, and his last words were to me, you know, what about trying to meet in Athens, and I said we'll deliver certain things and I - real actions - and we will agree to a meeting in Athens. He delivered those actions. DIMBLEBY: What were those actions in essence? OWEN: The first one was to get the Referendum idea, which was stupid, off the agenda, and superseded by another meeting of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The second was to get the endorsement of his stance as, from his own Parliament, and that meant challenging Schechil(phon), who was taking a very rampant "support the Bosnian Serbs and Republic of.... DIMBLEBY: ...this is his sort of number two, who is regarded as the most Fascistic of all.. OWEN: Yes. He's the most nationalistic. He's the man who has risen on the tide of nationalism which Milosevic himself inspired, but you know the old saying "he climbs on the tiger has difficulty in getting off", but I think Milosevic last Sunday convinced me that he wanted to get a settlement. And then we also have the Montenegrin Parliament too coming in. It is a Federal Republic, and President Bulatovic also strongly supported the plan - to have effectively Yugoslavia united, that the Bosnian Serbs couldn't continue. DIMBLEBY: Now, given that he is a pretty tough cookie, did he make it very clear to Karadzic that the war - in your judgement - that this war would not be permitted to be prosecuted any longer? OWEN: I think there was no doubt in the meetings that went on through the night and early this morning, in which Prime Minister Mitsotakis also played an important part - because the Greeks are traditional friends of the Serbs - that this couldn't go on and I think that was the final thing when they realised - the Bosnian Serbs - that they simply would not be sustained across the frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro. DIMBLEBY: Now in this studio, in this programme, a
representative of the Bosnian Government - although he's pleased that there's been some movement - does not believe for a moment that it will stick and he wants to get the UN troops in there very quickly indeed to police, as from now. OWEN: Well, he's speaking the same language as myself and Mr. Vance and his own President, President Izetbegovic. We would all like to see implementation as soon as is humanly possible and we will certainly look at having monitors on the ceasefire line. It's now possible to do that because you're not fixing the status quo. But the plan is very clear - the pull-back once the cessation of hostilities starts, and the clock starts ticking, the forces have to withdraw to their Provinces where they're going to have a majority - in the Serbian case its three Provinces - and that process of withdrawal has to take place within forty-five days. So the crucial question now for the United States is "are they going to contribute UN peace-keeping forces for Europe; are we going to put serious forces in as UN peace-keepers; and are we going to get them in there fast"? DIMBLEBY: Sorry to interrupt you. Can't see you down there - you can't see me. Are you saying that what John Major ought to be doing this evening is saying to President Clinton "We will put troops in there swiftly, but you've got to put troops in on the ground as well. Will you deliver on that? OWEN: I'm sure that's what he will be saying. John Major and Douglas Hurd have been thoroughly supportive of Mr. Vance and I throughout - indeed, so has the whole of the European Community. I don't think we can expect the United States to even put the majority. I would hope that the majority came from Europe - West and East, and I hope there will be a contribution from the Russian Federation. DIMBLEBY: How many troops do you believe are needed to police the ceasefire if it holds? OWEN: I'm not an expert and I defer to Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from NATO. I think he'll make the ultimate decision. The figure I often hear is fifty-thousand on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina - that's also its logistic tail there, but there's a logistic tail outside the country which will add another fifteen to twenty thousand, so it's fifty thousand forces there is what most people seem to be talking about, but that's... a lot depends on the climate, the atmosphere, the extent to which we get the trust and confidence of all the parties, the extent to which the West shows some generosity now in slowly and progressively withdrawing the economic sanctions. Don't withdraw them just on trust, but withdraw them a little more generously than sometimes we do on sanctions, and show a measure of trust. You can always put them back on if you can't... if it's not matched by the other side. DIMBLEBY: That's an interesting point, but that will... can only begin when the UN is convinced that this ceasefire is turning into a peace settlement. How long in your judgement do we give that? There's bound to be sporadic fighting still for the next day or two, or more. When do we say "This is it; one way or the other"? OWEN: It's a very complex plan and I only heard a little bit of your programme, but it's more detailed and more thought out actually than appeared, and all these time-tables have been carefully laid down and NATO's had time to study them. The time-table for withdrawal of heavy weapons, the time-table for demilitarisation of Sarajevo, and the return to the Provinces, and one thing we've been discussing of course very much over the last fortnight - how to get really effective forces into the northern corridor and there it would greatly help if we have forces from North America, from good, capable Western European Governments, and also from the Russian Federation. We're all in this together. I believe the countries that have been involved in this peace conference - thirty-two of them - will help us now on implementation. Most people have looked over the precipice at all the other options, military options, and they're all extremely unattractive and I think, therefore, there will be a really pretty strong commitment to making this peace settlement work. It will not be easy. Nobody's pretended otherwise, but it's a comprhensive settlement for stitching a country together that's been torn apart and ravaged by war, and there's more than just the military side - there's the human rights monitors, there's the human rights commissioners, there's the Ombudsmen, there's the whole need to try and reverse ethnic cleansing and to start the whole process, it's a much more fundamental process of reconciliation. DIMBLEBY: Now, if you are right and this process begins to happen, you want to hear much less (if I picked up what you said in the press conference correctly) you want to hear much less about any of the military options that are being canvassed. In this studio, Paddy Ashdown and Jack Cunningham of the Labour Party, were saying - and it's clear so far as one can detect it - that the Americans and the British Government are not backing off discussing the military option. Why do you think that that ought to be put on hold or on stand-by? OWWEN: Well, I don't think it's sensible not to discuss it and I think, you know, every.. proper caution is necessary if you've lived with as many different lies told to you as I have over the lat eight months. You're not going to take things just on paper, but I think you've also got to be positive and I think that the bombing option was always fraught with problems, fraught with difficulty. Any military intervention - even the no-fly zone had its problems and is now up and running. But I think that the key question is to talk about implementation and I'm sure that's what will have to happen in Warren Christopher's turn round Europe this time, and also when he goes to Moscow, because that's what the UN and the world expects now. They want this peace plan to be made to stick and they don't, I think, want to hear much talk about bombing. That may be something which we have to face up to but, frankly, it's changed. DIMBLEBY: May be something that we'll have to face up to? Do you say? OWEN: It may be, but I don't believe so. Look, come off it now - you've all had your time on bombing, now let's talk about peace and how you implement a peace plan. It's a complex thing to do but that's the SERIOUS question from SERIOUS people, and let the bombing and the bombers have... they've had their day now - let's get into the serious question of implementation. DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, that's a very interesting thing you're saying. As a negotiator and a peace negotiator who desperately hopes that it's going to work and believes it will work, of course you will say that. I'm only putting to you what it appears that others are still talking about. You're saying to them "Lay off it". OWEN: Well, they're behind the curve. They're behind the curve. The issue is now how to implement this peace plan. Well, we're bound to have our reservation. Obviously you're going to have a reservation until you can be clear that the Bosnian/Serb Assembly has signed up or, if they haven't done, the Yugoslavs have delivered, but let's be positive. That's not a bad thing to do in this present fraught time, and we need to have a little more optimism. We've got the signatures on a comprehensive peace plan - that's the crucial thing. DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, a lot of people will be hoping that your faith and your hard work will turn out as you want it to turn out. Thank you very much for talking to us. ...oooOooo.... ................................................................................ ON THE RECORD LORD OWEN INTERVIEW RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 2.5.93 ................................................................................ JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, on this second day of the talks how do you judge the prospects? LORD OWEN: Well I think most of the discussions, as is often the case in these sort of conferences, has gone on through the night and in the margin. Certainly, the three Presidents from Yugoslavia, led by Mr Milosevic have met through the night with Dr Karadzic and I hope that that persuasion will be decisive. DIMBLEBY: From the first three hours of so of talks that you had yesterday, is it clear to you that the Bosnian Serbs are being required to take this very seriously? OWEN: Oh, there's no doubt about that. I mean the formidable pressure that's coming on them is from the Belgrade Serbs and that's the one that they listen to, that's the one that effects them because the war machine inside Bosnia Herzegovina is fuelled from Yugoslavia, it's across the Serbian and Montenegrin border and that's why of course the world has put sanctions on Belgrade. We've rightly had no truck with this argument that they have no influence, they have a great deal of influence. DIMBLEBY: Is it your view that Milosevic is saying in effect: you have got to accept the Vance/Owen plan with maybe modification on corridors, otherwise you get nothing more from us, is he being as tough as that? OWEN: I think so. I, as you know, spent many hours with him...last week and in all the meetings that I had with him in Belgrade, but particularly last Sunday I came to the veiw that he had decided that this war had to end and he has the power to end it. Now, the problem is that the Serbian people and the Serbian unity across the nation is very strong whether you live in Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Croatia or Macedonia and they are very loath to ever be seen to be split in public. This division of opinion, now very open after the three Presidents' letters is crucial. The last time we had this split of opinion in Geneva, when Mr Vance and I negotiated with all of them, late into the night, in a hotel in Geneva, allowed the pressure to build up so that Dr Karadzic signed two of the documents, the constitutional principles and the one dealing with the defence, the military arrangements. Hopefully now we'll get those other two documents on track and signed in the next few days. DIMBLEBY: Now, it involves the Bosnian Serbs giving up something like thirty per cent of that land which they've occupied by force, Milosevic is one hundred per cent behind that and insisting on that as well? OWEN: The withdrawal to the provinces which is a crucial part of the plan, yes, I think he accepts that. DIMBLEBY: Now, if the deal is to work, am I right that a signature on a piece of paper in Belgrade is not enough. The Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic has got to go back to what is called the Bosnian Serb parliament and get them to agree it, otherwise it doesn't mean anything? OWEN: We don't yet know whether he..what is the status of where he'll sign, or whether it's ad-referendum or whether he goes back, that's a matter to some extent up to him. But, the crucial thing is the signature and the world's not going to delay, afterall the sanctions are in. I mean when I was negotiating with them in Belgrade of course, the clock was ticking and they were trying to avoid sanctions, the new sanctions even starting. Now, they know the sanctions are there, they are also feeling those sanctions, they're getting those sanctions really quite strongly at them and I think the financial seizure of financial assets is something which has been quite powerful because Milosevic was a banker and he understands now what's building up. So all these different pressures have certainly changed the minds of politicians and remember Milosevic actually won support for his stand in the Serbian parliament and President Bulatovic of Montenegro won very strong support from his parliament so this is no longer just the Presidents talking they've got the support of their political friends and collegues....Mr Schechil (phon) is isolated now. DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, you're sounding very optimistic that there will be a deal. When do you expect a settlement, how long can this run before you have a signature which can be waved in the air as a real deal? OWEN: I'm not keen on waving pieces of paper in the air but I personally think that it's right to be cautiously optimistic and as I say we'd like to get a signature as soon as possible. I'm not going to pin myself down on the days but they all know that it certainly would have to come no later than when they meet on Wednesday. DIMBLEBY: So Wednesday is the deadline in effect, before further action is likely to be on the cards, namely military action. OWEN: No, no, we're not tied in that sort of time scale. The consultations are going on as you know between the crucial countries but if, as the results of these dicussions there was no agreement, no signature the pressure would then come on even firmer, even more toughly from Milosevic. I mean I would expect to see the actual supply lines effectively cut by the Yugoslavs and that's what we're demanding. But, the issue will then come to the Security Council. I would be surprised if there was any form of rejection by Dr Karadzic if it didn't come pretty quickly to the Security Council. DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen as you know, the Americans are very sceptical about the Bosnian Serbs delivering on the basis of past evidence with quite a lot of justification. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, is in Britain to see the Prime Minister. How helpful to driving the Bosnian Serbs to sign is this American pressure for military action? OWEN: I don't think it has as much influence as you might think. It's extraordinary but the Bosnian Serbs are very isolated they...this is a sort of village peasant war to a great extent. As long as they go on getting their supplies from Belgrade, I don't think they really care very much or know very much about what is happening in the outside world. This is the problem, their so-called assembly is terribly insulated from any of these pressures. DIMBLEBY: Would you include in that lack of alarm about the military prospects, Milosevic and Serbia in general, or is his he very well aware of what this means? OWEN: He's very well aware of it, they are very very aware, it's a complete difference between Belgrade which is a sort of sophisticated cosmopolitan European city which the politicians are aware of European and international pressures and the situation on the ground in rural Bosnia Herzegovina in the areas controlled by the Serbians. They've built themselves up into a very isolated community, they think they can take on the world. It's a sort of traditional Serbian defiance, you know, and if you go to Pale, the mood is... it's a very unrealistic world and it's one of the political problems we're having to deal with. DIMBLEBY: But in the sophisticated world of Belgrade, does it matter from the point of view of the credibility of this additional lever of military action, which, of course, would have enormous consequences within the international community. Is that in in... effected or undermined by the clear division of view between the Europeans and the British on the one hand, and the Americans on the other about how far to go and how fast to go? OWEN: I don't think it matters tremendously. I think the economic pressures have been important, the political pressures. I think the fact that the military pressures are there is not unhelpful, I'm not against it but I think that fortunately it's not been overdone. I think if it was sounding very much as if this meeting was under a ultimatum I think that would actually probably have not worked. But the fact that President Clinton is saying he's not going to make a final decision until he's heard from the consultations with Warren Christopher, is about the right balance you know. DIMBLEBY: Is... sorry, Lord Owen, is this the last chance against that background, in your view, for talks before military action should happen? OWEN: I don't think you can tell. My own view is very clear that the really crucial pressure comes from Milosevic and if he decided to cut supplies off that's a lot better than doing it by bombs. Apart from anything else it would be very much more effective. DIMBLEBY: Dr Owen, do you expect indication, clear indication today finally, that there will be a Bosnian Serb signature? OWEN: I would be surprised if we don't get a even further commitment, even tougher commitment from Milosevic in particular to deliver a settlement out of today's discussions. Hopefully even more positive and more specific than that. ...oooOooo...