NB: THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS TYPED FROM A TRANSCRIPTION UNIT RECORDING AND NOT COPIED FROM AN ORIGINAL SCRIPT: BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MIS-HEARING AND THE DIFFICULTY, IN SOME CASES, OF IDENTIFYNG INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS, THE BBC CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY. ............................................................................... ON THE RECORD SIR LEON BRITTAN INTERVIEW RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1 DATE: 06.12.92 ............................................................................... JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: Sir Leon Brittan, it's not going to be easy is it for the Prime Minister to pull his Presidential chestnuts out of the fire at Edinburgh? SIR LEON BRITTAN: Not easy but not impossible, you probably remember that at about this distance before the Maastricht Council itself we were going through the same period of it looking jolly difficult and in fact it proved possible, but it's not a guarantee that it will be. DIMBLEBY: Let's take some of the key elements in what he's described as the Rubik Cube, the Government has said on the budget "we will not move on the question of the British rebate" can Britain hold that line? BRITTAN: Yes I think Britain can hold that line.
If Britain is prepared to move, not too much but just a bit on the actual budget people will understand that Britain can't move on the rebate, there'll be a great argy bargy about it but I think it can end up that way. DIMBLEBY: But he's got to be able to move on the size of the budget itself, moving towards the Commission's figure or Delors'
figure rather than holding it at near freeze. BRITTAN: Well Britain hasn't proposed to hold it at near freeze, Britain has already proposed an increase in the budget, the Commission came up with a larger figure, Delors brought it down and somewhere in between you've got to reach a figure that everyone could accept. Remembering always of course that there's no increase proposed by the Commission for the first two years, so somewhere or other you've got to accept a figure which is acceptable all round and Britain's not alone in not wanting to increase it a great deal, but on the other hand you can't expect to spend on Eastern Europe and things of that kind without providing the extra money. DIMBLEBY: But if the rebate is to be protected and held at its present level, if he isn't..if he's going to get that from the others, are there other concessions that he's got to offer as well as on the budget or is that going to be enough within that framework? BRITTAN: No, I think on the budgetry issue what the makings of a deal would be to keep the rebate as it is but that will take a lot of fighting for, but then for Britain to increase the present figure that it's prepared to go to by a small amount and reach a deal on that basis. DIMBLEBY: Will it help Britain's position if openly John Major says "well you don't have to have the European Bank in London, we give up our claim on it". BRITTAN: Well it's part of a package deal. There are a lot of European institutions that have to be found homes and not just the Bank and you could please a lot of people by doing a package deal which would include the Bank. The Spaniards are very keen that the environmental agency should go to Seville, the French are extremely anxious about the Parliament and the reassurance that that would continue to be in Strasbourg for its preliminary sessions, twelve times a year and that frankly as far as the Bank is concerned it's jolly difficult to argue for the Bank being in London if Britain hasn't decided to join EMU stage three, so if you could do a deal which accepted that the Bank went to Germany but not to Frankfurt, to Bonn, then I think you would win a lot of browny points all round and that would help I think in securing Britain's objectives in all other respects. DIMBLEBY: Do you expect Britain to deliver that? BRITTAN: Well that you must ask British ministers about but I think if that was possible it would be a big contribution to the success of the summit. DIMBLEBY: On the question of the recovery programme about which there has been much fierce debate, do you think Britain is going to have to compromise the position of the moment which is essentially we're not very keen on any recovery package? BRITTAN: Well you say that but actually what is coming forward from the Commission is something that's very much in line with Britain's Autumn Statement. The idea of concerting national economies to focus on capital expenditure rather than current expenditure, to give priority to those capital projects and to cut down on public sector pay, that's a concept which can be applied Europe wide and the facility that the Commission has suggested, a five billion loan which will be negotiated because the Community's able to do so at very favourable rates and then those countries that want it for the..use for the capital projects will be able to draw on it but will not have any obligation to do so and won't have to spend a penny unless they choose to borrow from that loan. All of that fits in very much with the British conception while at the same time enabling a boost for capital expenditure across Europe through those trans-European links which could include of course the rail link to the Channel. I think that there's no disagreement of philosophy whether Britain accepts this or not, we shall see,
but I think that there is no conflict there at all. DIMBLEBY: Just on that last point, you're saying that that.. some of that money could go towards financing the rail link to the Channel so that a little bit comes back to Britain as it were. BRITTAN: Oh and of course links with Northern Ireland and the Republic and all of that, Britain.. this is something which Britain could certainly gain from. DIMBLEBY: On the question of our old friend or new friend subsidiarity, there is huge capital invested in domestic British politics in toughening up and clarifying the notion of subsidiarity, now the Government has come up with a list of potential areas where powers should return to Britain either legislation that's already in place should be.. should revert or proposed legislation, it's quite a list - is he going to get it? BRITTAN: Well it's not a question of returning powers to Britain it's a case of the Community deciding what should..needs to be done at Community level and what can be left to the member states. Now a great deal of progress has been made on this, as far as the principles and the practice are to be applied and already you are actually seeing the Commission coming up with far fewer proposals and ditching quite a few that have been in the pipeline. Now the Commission itself I hope is going to come up with a list, quite an impressive list I hope, of proposals which it's not going to go on with or existing law which it's going to amend, precisely because it considers it isn't necessary to do that at Community level. I think that that list and you have to match it with with the British Presidency proposals you'll be able to get something quite impressive out of that from Edinburgh if all goes well. DIMBLEBY: Are the Europeans as determined to yield as it were from the centre to the regions in this matter as Britain has to be in order to get those Conservative back-benchers on side or is it a much cooler issue for the rest of Europe? BRITTAN: If you talk about it in terms of yielding, a lot of people won't like that and they'll be right not to because it isn't like that. The principle works both ways, the principle of subsidiarity is not just about not doing what isn't necessary it's also about doing what is necessary. If you put it that way and say it's a sensible, practical principle of saying let's do together what we can better do together and what doesn't need to be done together because there's no added value in it and it can be left to the member states then I think you'll get agreement. DIMBLEBY: I put it that way because as you know that's the way the British have a powerful tendency of putting it in the debate. BRITTAN: Well of course that's natural that you should do so but I'm putting it in the way that's most likely to reach an agreement at Edinburgh. DIMBLEBY: Let's go to the perhaps overwhelming issue or the top of the agenda, the question of the Danish referendum, it is critical for the credibility of the British Presidency to deliver something that the rest of Europe and the Danes think will create momentum for Maastricht, it looks pretty unlikely at the moment does it not? BRITTAN: No it doesn't look pretty unlikely, it looks difficult but I wouldn't go so far as to say unlikely. The truth of the matter is that hardly any of the things that the Danes actually want really cause problems for her partners, it's the way it's put and the legality of it, the.. in fact I think there's a wide degree of concensus, it's the form in which it's put that has to be hammered out and such matters as its legality, its duration and so on. DIMBLEBY: Well let's look at both those things. On the question of substance rather than form, we have the Christian Democrats crying foul already, we have Chancellor Kohl saying you can't have Europe a la carte, on the other hand we have the Danes openly now in disarray about the character and quality of what Major is proposing. BRITTAN: Well disarray is wonderfully colourful but what you mean is disagreement and that doesn't, that's not infrequent and what..and this is a negotiation and some of the Danish parties are saying that what Britain has proposed doesn't go far enough and some of Britain's partners are at this stage saying that it goes too far... DIMBLEBY: But when for instance.. BRITTAN: ....substance and see whether there is a possible agreement. DIMBLEBY: Well then how do you rate what the speaking for the Christian Democrats, the former Prime Minister of Belgium Martins (phon) when he says a declaration by the, or a decision, by which Denmark and I'm quoting him now "will never join the final phase of monetary union" which is of course what the Danes are insisting on "will never be a member of the political union, is not acceptable to us". BRITTAN: Well you see the word "never" is the key to that and, of course, the way out of that is very simple, the Maastricht Treaty itself is due to be revised at a new intergovernmental conference in 1996 and I think that you deal with that problem by saing that the commitments and undertakings that are made lasts as long as the Maastricht Treaty itself lasts. That avoids the use of the word "never" while at the same time giving the Danes the assurance that they are not committed to anything further because of course, any new treaty would also have to be agreed by unanimity. There are ways through these things if you want to find them. DIMBLEBY: And you're always adept at seeking to find those ways Sir Leon, which is why it's interest to hear you say that. Now let's go to the second area that you touched on, form or if you like also the question of the standing of any declaration that is made, the Danes say they won't accept a simple declaration tacked onto the Treaty, they want whatever is tacked on, whatever declaration there is, to have the same force in law as the Treaty itself. But the others can't concede that can they? BRITTAN: Well it's not quite the same force as the Treaty itself, they want it to be legally binding. Now what the other states don't want, and very understandably, is to renegotiate the Treaty and to have to ratify it because most countries will have ratified it by the end of the year, all ten probably, apart bar Britain and Denmark. DIMBLEBY: Well how can you have it legally binding if it, if the Treaty isn't ratified? BRITTAN: I will just come to that - because what you can have is an agreement which is not part of the Treaty and not a new Treaty that is nonetheless an international agreement, possibly one that even can be registered as such in the way that international law provides, but is separate from the Maastricht Treaty. That's one way of doing it. Others say that you don't even have to go as far as that, that an actual decision of the heads of government granted the special role given to the heads of government by the Maastricht Treaty, is itself legally binding. So there are ways through that one as well if you have the common will to achieve it. DIMBLEBY: Now if that common will is not there or if it can't be achieved, obviously Maastricht is self evidently in terrible trouble. BRITTAN: Yes, but the most important point that you don't allow for is that there is a huge common desire to find a way forward because everybody knows that the Community has been a bit in the doldrums in the few weeks and months, and the desire to get it moving is one that is shared. Therefore, so long as the particular concerns, whether it's for money, whether it's for legality as far as the Danes are concerned, whether it's to have the right balance in subsidiarity, so long as all that can be met there is a common desire to relaunch the European Community. Don't forget on the first of January we actually have the single market coming into effect. DIMBLEBY: Okay Sir Leon, will, given that, John Major come under great pressure at Edinburgh to say when Britain will ratify? BRITTAN: Well he's already said pretty clearly what's going to happen, he has said that he anticiaptes that the Third Reading in the House of Commons will be in the late Spring and that the ratification procedure will be completed in the next parliamentary session.
DIMBLEBY: Forgive me Sir Leon, forgive me Sir Leon as I am sure that you know there is much greater ambiguity than that. He seems to have said on the one hand that it will be after the Danish referendum and on the other hand it'll be done by the Summer. If that ambiguity persists which I think is widely recognised in this country to be there, is that going to irritate even more profoundly the European Parliament? BRITTAN: That's not the ambiguity, the ambiguity is whether British Third Reading in the House of Commons is CONDITIONAL upon a Danish referendum being at that time or not, that's where the ambiguity lies. Now.. DIMBLEBY: Well has that got to be resolved? BRITTAN: If in fact you reach an agreement under which the Danes are satisfied and say that they are going to hold the referendum in the Spring then the problem doesn't arise because the condition is met and that is the best way forward. DIMBLEBY: Now it's always lovely to have everyone smiling and putting arms around each other, the fact of the matter is it could arise and I want to know what you think if it does arise, that the Danes aren't able to say or don't say "we will have the referendum in the Spring, we're going to have it later" - will John Major, if he wants to get an awful lot of other things from the Europeans, have to say "nonetheless we will ratify BEFORE the Summer recess". BRITTAN: Well it's not a question of ratifying before the Summer recess because of course the thing has got to go to the House of Lords and everything else. DIMBLEBY: Third Reading. BRITTAN: Third Reading, yes. I think that if the Danes were to delay the referendum until the Autumn that would lead to a lot of criticism of the Danes and I think that they will wish to avoid that at all cost. I think that the focus would be at least as much on the Danes as on Britain, obviously people would be wanting Britain to ratify in any event, as early as possible, on the timetable that has been foreshadowed, but you still couldn't have implementation of the Treaty because the Danes would be holding it up until the Autumn so that is why, that is why the whole focus will be on avoiding that and reaching an agreement so that the Danes have their referendum in the Spring. DIMBLEBY: Let me put it another way round - would it greatly help relations between the partners if John Major were able to say "we will ratify in the Spring, we hope that will be after the Danish referendum (sorry Third Reading), we hope that'll be after the Danish referendum has been held but if not we will still go ahead and do it" - would that help him? BRITTAN: Well it depends what else happens in Edinburgh, it may not be necessary but I..it's difficult to see circumstances in which that particular line arises because either the Danes have agreed to have their referendum in the Spring, in which case that's not necessary, or, the Danes insist that they hold it later on in the Autumn, in which case British ratification early doesn't help the general implementation. DIMBLEBY: Sir Leon, quite a lot a stake. BRITTAN: There is, of course, as always. But I think that I have been able to show that there are ways forward on all the fronts that you've mentioned. It doesn't necessarily mean that they will be achieved, but it can be done. DIMBLEBY: Sir Leon Brittan, as ever, thank you. BRITTAN: Thank you.